helios (9297) Nov 22, 2011 at 6:07am
Wouldnât genuine knowledge require that he knows what he is, some characteristic of what he is?
I don't agree. It'd be more knowledge, indeed, but not more genuine than knowing whether he is. Just like knowing whether "there exists x in S such that P(x)" and knowing x are different degrees of equally valid knowledge.
Is he, for instance, in vivo or in machina?
Any programmer will tell you they don't believe there's a difference beyond artificial distinctions.
And with all your thinking that leads you to knowing that you are, it doesnât mean knowing anything, reallyâŠeven that you are real since, of course, just by you thinking them doesnât guarantee that your thoughts are even your own.
I question the ontological status of a perfectly passive observer lacking both internal state and processes to modify it. Even ideal programs in Turing machines exist to a higher degree than that.
On the other hand, an observer complex enough to have state and processes does exist to a meaningful degree. With respect to its supposed thoughts, it would be at the same level as an animal lacking self-awareness (say, a cat) with respect to the world.
I'm okay with being a cat.
I can't get over the assumption that hypercomputation (specifically the kind that allows running infinite instructions in finite time) is logically possible to take the simulation argument seriously. |
@helios
You and I might disagree on the epistemological definition of knowledge. But before I go further, Iâm asking you to spare me the propositional/syllogistic/formal logic notation. I did my time in philosophy, ethics, and logics classes, but I donât recall offhand all the rules of the symbols systems.
Despite my lack of recall from the philosophy classes, I donât see where your statement, âThere exists x in S such that P(x),â means anything. What does it mean? My brain cross-wires it to set theory, where Iâm thinking you have to have something like x|{x=value or trait set}. And Jeez! I just tried looking something up about your statement, and I had forgotten I had learned so much stuff and that whole different symbol set. (Refresher for me: the backwards âEâ means âthere existsâ, btw. And â^â means âallâ instead of exponentiating something.) Okay, but I surmise that your statement means, âThere exists an x as an element of S such that x has the property P.â I still say x at least has to be delineated first (such as {x = west of y}) before you can begin to know anything about x or S. An undefined set could be crazy, something like x|{x = y / 0}.
Do you believe that knowledge is only known in context? For instance, say I hold up a sheet of paper with what is apparently a large black square. Do you know, before any manipulations on the black square, that the letter âjâ is contained within the black square (such as by removing all ânon-jâ pixels? You can extrapolate from that scenario to something like, âDo you know that my entire Python programming manual is contained within the black square?â I think itâs safe to equate âcontextâ with âcircumstanceâ, btw. Whatâs your stance on a priori and a posteriori knowledge-wise?
You claim that any programmer will tell me that the distinction between an organic sentient being and an inorganic (sentient as well?) thing, in vivo v. in machina, is purely artificial. Really? What would be the equivalent of neurogenesis or hepatic regeneration within a machine? Do the most sophisticated machines have genuine opinions and feelings gained from their experiences? What kind of identity (not 1 = (0 + 1), but self-proclaimed âI am _ _ _ _â) would a machine have? It doesnât matter how it gets into an entityâs environment for consumption and metabolism/processing/reorganization, in other words?
You asserted something I think is outrageous. With your cat example, you actually have argued that a self-unaware existent can possess knowledge! Are you serious?
Get this with your cat argument: You concede that a cat is lacking self-awareness. (That may or may not be a fact, but itâs your stated concession/proposition, nonetheless.) That means a cat could not form an identity of itself separate from its environment. In other words, that means a cat could not have a cognitive level to discern between himself and not-himself; a cat, according to you, could not know it exists as a discrete entity. That means a cat could not objectify (âsubjectifyâ) or conceptualize itself as âIâ in the first place. So, if your cat thought something, according to your own statements, then the cat, lacking self-awareness, could not be the agent of its own thoughts.
A cat, not knowing it is an âIâ apart from all-that-is, couldnât be a knower. A cat couldnât formulate itself as a subject, much less say/think/meow, âI know this or that.â This is according to you, yet you still say that a cat can know, at the very least, that it exists. (It thinks, therefore it knows it is, to restate the Descartes quote.) Really?
Care to educate me or to try again or to clearly define your terms or to concede? Câmon, man! That cat thing was way out.
Btw, running infinite instructions in finite time/space is acceptable to the point of being literally flatly mundane in many various fields of mathematics. For instance, the Planck length is used all the time in various computations. (Of course, remember, that âinfiniteâ is most technically a direction, so in 2-D itâs [negative infinity⊠< - - - - - > zero < - - - - - > âŠinfinity].) And what does the Planck length look like from one perspective? It looks like zero length, a point at best (âlikeâ != âisâ, I know). Or say you plot a particleâs trajectory, employing the h with a sine wave function. Instead of loop-de-loop, itâs going to look like a straight line. Thatâs because at the Planck scale, quantum indeterminacy is basically an absolute, which gives rise to the paradox that the absolute is totally conditional. (Iâm only talking basic trigonometry here and leaving out non-Euclidean geometries and higher maths.) So, what you have with the Planck length is, for all practical purposes, the paradox of infinite frequency with zero wavelength. And then you can marvel at the Planck time, which is (Planck length) / (speed of light). Then remember the mind-blower is that âstuff happenedâ below the Plancks, before time and space themselves unfurled. Then for a full-on logical meltdown, consider the credence of all those theoristsâ claims, which say that not all the worlds that came to be, which exist concurrently with all other worlds, express the dimensions of time and/or space. In other words, there is a time for timelessness and a space for nothingness. Creeps me out!
These epistemological queries are spot-on for knowing the doings of various neutrinos and such. The first question should be to reconcile how an entity defined as having mass (neutrinos of all varieties) is less constrained (by forces or fields) than an entity defined as having no mass (photons). I think a lot of physicists are actually your aforementioned cats.